During the first Trump Administration, the phrase “policy by tweet” became fashionable in certain circles. The idea being that President Trump was so erratic and mercurial that the U.S. essentially had no foreign policy; the only way to find out what America’s moves would be, was to read DJT’s tweets and try to gauge what he was about to do.
Equally popular, though in much smaller circles and for different reasons, was the phrase “policy by CONOP1”. The idea being that the U.S. military’s strategic and operational goals in a given conflict or region were so nebulous, or even non-existent, that the forces on the ground were essentially building U.S. policy from the bottom up by undertaking one tactical operation at a time. Over time, these tactical effects built on one another and established an overall strategic direction—by accretion, rather than by intent.
But were we, in fact, rudderless? Or was there actually a bigger plan at work?
F3EA
“Policy by CONOP” may be best illustrated with the so-called “F3EA cycle”, developed during the War on Terror.
F: find. Determine where Shitbag A lives/works/etc.
F: fix. Put “eyes on”, or otherwise positively confirm the current location of Shitbag A.
F: finish. Kill/capture Shitbag A.
E: exploit. Grab all the documents and electronics Shitbag A had with him, and pull out all the info these documents contain.
A: analyze. Use the resulting info to determine where Shitbags B, C, and D live.
Repeat (hence “F3EA cycle”).
Some implementations added a “D” step at the end, for “disseminate”. Your unit might not be able to go after Shitbags B, C, and D, but you still want to share the info with the broader community in case some other unit can. You’d see this more often in conventional units, which were limited in assets and/or authorities; Special Operations Forces (SOF) units generally had much looser constraints and more abundant resources, and consequently would leave out the “D”. They’d just keep going and going, each iteration fueling the next.
This was a very effective way to “finish” large numbers of Shitbags. Sometimes, an assault force would go out multiple times per night, each mission being driven by the one before it.
By Measures of Performance, we were rocking and rolling. How could we not be? We cleared 17 Shitbags off the board! 3 of them were even Named Objectives2! Give that man another medal right now!
By Measures of Effectiveness… the situation was a little more murky. Yes, we were clearing out all the Mohammads, and all the Yusufs, and all the Abu Hajjis3. But were we getting any closer to victory?
Put another way: we were very, very good at F3EA. We were finding and finishing MFers left and right. Where were we going? No idea! But we were going there with great speed and energy, and that’s all that mattered.
Rojava
“Kurdistan” doesn’t exist as a nation-state. The Kurds live in a more-or-less contiguous area of western Iran, northern Iraq, northeastern Syria, and southeastern Turkey.
In Iraq, the Kurds have their own federal region, which is somewhat autonomous (less so after their failed bid for independence from the central government) and fairly safe and prosperous. Erbil is the kind of town where even a soft Air Force guy could go “outside the wire”—such as it was—and buy souvenir coffee mugs at the local mall. He could also buy coffee and ice cream at the nearby Carrefour grocery (and beer in the Ankawa neighborhood) and ship it out to his forward teams in Collins boxes marked “urgent blood shipment”. Not that anyone ever would; but one could. Just sayin’.
In Turkey, Kurds are an oppressed ethnic minority. They have conducted and/or been accused of terrorist campaigns against the central government. One of the most notorious and dangerous terrorist groups—recognized as such by the US and the EU, FWIW—is the PKK.
In Syria, the Kurd-dominated area is called “Rojava”. When ISIS took over parts of Iraq and Syria, the Kurdish militias (the men’s YPG and the women’s YPJ) fought back and kept them at bay. Turkey accuses the YPG of being linked to the PKK and bitterly opposes US support for the Syrian Kurdish militias. Whenever they get a chance, the Turks invade Rojava with armor and artillery—far outclassing anything the Kurds can put up—giving their invasions ironic names like “Operation Peace Spring” and “Operation Olive Branch”. (Almost as ironic as “Operation Iraqi Freedom”…)
Syria today
The US supports NATO ally Turkey. Turkey opposed the Assad government (or “regime”, as it became fashionable to call it). Turkey also collaborates closely with Sunni extremist groups; currently with al Qaeda-aligned groups, and formerly also with Islamic State—back when they were a major presence. Back in the day, Turkey heavily facilitated the flow of IS foreign fighters and resources into Syria. There was a well-known and established smuggling route whereby fighters would fly into Istanbul, drive to the border, and cross right under the watchful eyes of Turkish border guards.
The US, through DoD SOF teams, supports the Kurds of Rojava. The Kurds opposed both the Assad government and the Islamic State. Now, they’re fighting against Sunni militants and trying to hold out against the Turkish army.
The US, through CIA paramilitary teams, also supports Sunni groups opposed to the Kurds and to Assad. (Hence the memes, 100% true, about CIA-backed Sunni militias fighting against DoD-backed Kurdish militias in Syria).
Assad isn’t around anymore, Turkey is keeping the Kurds pinned down in Rojava, and the Sunni extremist groups—hastily painting over their al Qaeda livery—are now in charge of what’s left of Syria.
Disaster for US foreign policy? Not at all. The Shia Crescent—the overland route from Iran, through Shia-dominated Iraq, through Syria, to Lebanon and the Mediterranean—has been disrupted, and Iran can no longer send aid directly to anti-Israel groups (at least, not as easily).
The point was never to liberate the suffering people of Syria from the Western-educated eye doctor. It was to protect Israel from Iranian-backed threats. As Dubya might say, mission accomplished.
Hedging our bets
Within that context, our seemingly nonexistent military strategy suddenly makes sense. We were not pursuing any military end in Syria, except incidentally. Sure, it’s great that we schwacked a bunch of ISIS—that sort of thing really helped to sell the war back home. However, the real reason we were there was to disrupt the so-called “Iranian malign influence network” and “Iranian lethal aid facilitation network”.
So the US planted a number of seeds. Support to Turkey through NATO; support to Sunnis through the CIA; support to Kurds through the DoD. At least one of them was bound to bear useful fruit: the destabilization of Syria, the fall of the Assad government, and the entry of an anti-Shia (and therefore anti-Iran) government to replace it. Everything else was gravy.
And “policy by CONOP”? Yes, we were making up our own goals, because there was no military victory condition. We were there as one of the torpedoes fired at a ship: just do damage, let in as much water as we can, and eventually the thing will sink. Which hit is the fatal one, doesn’t really matter.
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CONOP (or CONOPS) = Concept of Operations, a shorthand referring to a proposed mission. A subordinate commander proposes a CONOP, a superior command authority (higher commander, SECDEF, or even CINC/POTUS) reviews and approves it, and the subordinate commander then executes.
Some Shitbags were important enough that our intelligence had full targeting packages developed for them, complete with a classified “objective name” such as “Objective SPEARMINT RHINO”. You’d never say “this is an operation to kill/capture Osama bin Laden”; you’d say “this is an operation to kill/capture OBJ SPEARMINT RHINO”. Everyone who needed to know, would know exactly who that was.
Some Shitbags were just low-level operatives. Some were literally known as “ASWs” or “associated with”. Example: “MAM (Military-Aged Male) ASW OBJ SPEARMINT RHINO”. This particular MAM’s crime was being associated with OBJ SPEARMINT RHINO. Maybe they were observed riding in the same car once.
I know that this is not a name. I’m being sarcastic and referencing the general level of willful ignorance about our opponents that was—and still is—prevalent in the National Security Establishment.
If we had a legit goal to absolutely obliterate anything tangible and set it right, we could have done so. “Winning” was never the tangible goal.